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Frazier 1 
Prudence and Executive Control: 
An Analysis of the Decision-Making Processes of the Christian and the Modern Man 
 
 Breathless and red in the face, your neighbor approaches you in your yard. 
Apparently angry, he stammers, “Hey, any chance I can get that hunting rifle I lent you 
back?” The situation does not appear normal to you—especially after you remember 
hearing a loud altercation occur over in the vicinity of your neighbor’s backyard. You 
know your neighbor to have a short temper, but you have never encountered him this 
angry before. Thoughts race through your head as you attempt to decide whether or not 
you ought to return his rifle. You do owe your neighbor—he was charitable enough to 
loan it to you for your weekend hunting trip. It would be equally just to give him his due. 
Given the circumstances, what are the chances that, upon returning his gun, he may harm 
someone? After some deliberation, you judge it to be more prudent to provide an excuse 
as to why you cannot return it at the moment. You believe the situation to be too 
hazardous to return the rifle to your neighbor. For the common good of the neighborhood, 
and your angry neighbor, it is best for you to withhold justice until he has calmed down.1 
 How does one come to this decision? The primary concern of this composition is 
to explore two different perspectives of this question: whether modern scientific research 
can sufficiently explain the Christian intellectual virtue of prudence. I aim to illustrate 
that executive control, while able to explain, “How or whether a person goes about doing 
something,2” is unable to account for the greater question of why. I propose that St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ explanation of prudence provides a reasonable, satisfactory answer. In 
                                                        
1
 Adapted from Titus, Craig Steven. “Reasonable Acts.” Philosophical Virtues and 
Psychological Strengths: Building the Bridge. Eds. Cessario, Romanus, Craig Steven 
Titus, and Paul C. Vitz.  Sophia Institute Press, 2013. 110-114. 
2
 Lezak, Muriel Deutsch. Neuropsychological Assessment. (5th ed.) Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2012. Print. 37. 
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order to best perform this analysis, I will first present the intellectual virtue of prudence 
as Christians understand it. In doing so, I will provide the classical, Thomistic account for 
this virtue. Next, in order to identify the parallels between prudence and the modern 
narrative, it is important to explore the intricacies of executive control, which will 
provide a modern account for decision-making and all of the factors contained therein. 
Last I will explicate the gaps in executive function’s explanation of prudence as it relates 
to the modern man.  
I. PRUDENCE 
 The intellectual virtue of prudence is more than just making the right decision. In 
the context of our daily lives, we hear advisors chirp, “Be prudent” so as to mean 
“Careful!” or “Don’t spend your money carelessly!” But the Catholic Church places more 
stock in the virtue of prudence as it relates to our faith lives than we might infer from 
these suggestions we hear when trying on a pair of jeans. Prudence, referred to as ‘The 
Queen of all virtues,’ holds a place of high esteem in Christian Tradition. To best 
understand the virtue of prudence, I will define and explain the virtue and the role it plays 
in each individual’s faith life. Then I will explore, through the perspective James F. 
Keenan, S.J. sets forth in his essay “The Virtue of Prudence,” how prudence operates, 
perfects, and directs us. 
Before diving into St. Thomas Aquinas’s explanation and analysis of the nature of 
prudence as an intellectual virtue, first let us understand what the virtue is. Prudence is 
unlike other virtues, which are, “purposive disposition[s], lying in a mean that is relative 
to us and determined by a rational principle.3” The way in which it is most unlike virtues 
                                                        
3
 Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Book 2, Chapter VI. 
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of the will (e.g. temperance, courage, etc.) is that prudence is not meant to attain the 
mean. Prudence either works or it does not. Some actions can be more prudent than 
others, but there is no such thing as being ‘too prudent,’ in the Christian sense of the 
word. St. Thomas echoes Aristotle when he defines prudence as, “right reason applied to 
action.4” Let us further examine this definition. 
St. Thomas addresses the nature of prudence in the first three articles of question 
47 of the Second Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica. He responds to 
challenges regarding the faculty to which prudence belongs and by which faculty the 
virtue is applied. In these first three articles, Thomas argues that prudence lies within our 
cognitive faculties (intellect), is for practical knowledge alone, and can be applied to 
particulars. In the first article, Thomas delineates prudence as a cognitive faculty. It relies 
on, “obtain[ing] knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past.5” Next, 
he defends the practical application of prudence: “Counsel is about things that we have to 
do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is 
the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical 
reason.6” Last, Thomas argues for prudence’s application to “singulars,” or particular 
situations, as opposed to universals:  
But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows 
both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it is applied. Now 
actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man 
to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about 
which actions are concerned.7  
 
                                                        
4
 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. “IIa IIae, q. 47 a. 2” 
5
 Ibid.“IIa IIae, q. 47 a. 1” 
6
 Ibid. “IIa IIae, q. 47 a. 2” 
7
 Ibid. “IIa IIae, q. 47 a. 3” 
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Taken together, it is important to note that prudence resides within the intellect and the 
will. Because prudence belongs to our cognitive faculties and, at the same time to our 
will, for it can be applied in particular situations to our actions. We must consider the 
implications. 
Consider this analogy. Prudence operates as a general would oversee his 
lieutenants. The virtues have their own capacities. Temperance needs to moderate how 
much or how little one should eat or drink. In self-expression, one must express himself 
truthfully, not in a boastful or understated manner. When embarrassed, one must express 
himself with modesty, not in shyness or shamelessness. These virtues have jurisdiction 
over these particular actions, as a lieutenant has control over how he runs his barracks. To 
the same point, prudence has control and eminence over all of these virtues of emotion, 
as a general directs his lieutenants on strategy and purpose going into battle.  
For example, let’s examine the behavior of a young man at a party. The man finds 
himself conversing with a beautiful young lady. He hopes to impress this woman because 
he is attracted to her. In doing so, he attempts to be funny. In selecting a joke, however, 
he needs to maintain a polite and respectful demeanor. In this realm of conversation, he 
must practice the virtue of wittiness. If he is too witty, he errs to the excess—or 
buffoonery; if he is not witty enough, he errs to the deficiency—or boorishness. This 
man’s prudence, if it is well formed, will deliberate, judge and act according to the good. 
The importance of balancing his action or feeling in conversation is twofold: first, he 
must not betray his own values in order to impress this woman. Perhaps the woman 
prefers men who act like buffoons. The man should not feel inclined to act like a buffoon, 
for if he does, it will most probably not lead to his fulfillment. On a deeper level, he must 
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not deceive her, for that will provide the woman with an inaccurate impression of who he 
is. The former deals primarily with his long-term pursuit of goodness. The second deals 
with the common good—the good of the woman and both individuals’ lives as they strive 
toward virtue, truth, and goodness moving forward.  
In this way, prudence takes into account the particulars of a situation and recalls 
past experience, belonging both to the individual and those whom the individual might 
have observed (i.e. mentors). In this act of deliberation, prudence engages the intellect in 
proposing multiple courses of action and their outcomes. Then, using our knowledge of 
the good, it judges, “how best to [proceed] from right intention, and [guides] by true 
beliefs about how best to bring about the good end.8” Belief in and pursuance of the good 
lies implicitly within this explanation. Pursuing the good or a particular end is perhaps 
the most important aspect of the Christian understanding of prudence. This nuance is 
something I believe to be unaccounted for in the modern explanation of decision-making. 
I will support this belief in section three of this composition.  
Prudence also perfects an individual’s moral life. Perfection requires no 
completion. In Christian theology, this complicated concept is seen in God, whose 
goodness flows from His perfection—for He requires no improvement. He does not wait 
for completion. Unlike God, however, our moral lives seek perfection, for they are 
incomplete. Part of the intellectual virtue’s function, as mentioned above, is to recall past 
experience in deliberation. In so doing, prudence recalls moral failures and consequences 
of past decisions. Critics of Christian moral theology have argued that because prudence 
                                                        
8
 Wood, W. Jay. "Prudence." Virtues and Their Vices. By Kevin Timpe and Craig A. 
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is an intellectual virtue, it is not able to engage material objects. Keenan answers this in 
his piece on Prudence in The Ethics of Aquinas:  
Although the moral virtues perfect the rational, irascible, or concupiscible 
appetites, they do so inasmuch as they engage objects that will perfect 
these appetites. The objects engaged are right if they are prudential. If the 
object of justice, temperance, or fortitude is not prudential, the act will not 
be just, temperate, or fortitudinous, nor will it perfect the agent.9 
 
Keenan also makes it a point to distinguish acts that make one more just, temperate, or 
fortitudinous. Prudence is only able to perfect a person if the individual acts according to 
her guidance. In a way, prudence is a self-reinforcing virtue: the more an individual 
hones his virtues, the more prudential they become. In so doing, they become more 
virtuous. The image that comes to mind in regards to prudence is a spiral staircase: 
although cyclic, one improves their standing with each step forward (and upward).  
 The last aspect of the nature of prudence left for discussion is the way in which 
prudence directs the moral life of the individual. One must understand that prudence 
works within our natural inclinations. It shapes and guides us until our inclinations are 
naturally in line with the good. St. Thomas calls this connaturality—or, second nature. 
Keenan interprets it thus: “Prudence directs in two ways: it perfects the practical reason 
as it determines and pursues the means for attaining the natural inclination’s 
perfection.10” It follows, then, that human beings were created with the potential to lead 
prudential lives of virtue. This does not, of course, take into account sin and acts of 
imprudence, which will not be considered for it is not within the scope of this 
composition. 
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 Keenan, S.J., James F. “The Virtue of Prudence.” Pope, Stephen J., ed. The ethics of 
Aquinas. Georgetown University Press, 2002. 262. 
10
 Ibid. 263. Emphasis added. 
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II. EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
 Human beings have developed a variety of intellectual abilities over the course of 
our evolution. These intellectual abilities have enabled the most heralded achievements of 
human existence. Through the mapping of the neural networks in our brains, we have 
been able to pinpoint the loci of many of the functions that ‘make us human.’ The 
prefrontal cortex is of particular interest in this discussion of prudence. Executive control, 
or executive functioning, “refers to processes serving to monitor and control thought and 
action, including attention regulation and response inhibition.11” First, we will explore 
executive control and how it works. Next, we will examine the parts of executive control 
and how, when dysfunctional, cause problems in day-to-day decisions we make. The 
field of psychology and cognitive neuroscience has divided executive control in varying 
ways. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, we will address executive control as it is 
divided into volition, planning and decision-making, and inhibition. In each part of 
executive control, this section will seek to find parallels in the way executive functions 
explains prudence in terms of the decision-making process of the modern man. 
 The executive functions are intimately linked to our cognitive abilities. Because 
of this, it is difficult to believe that our executive functions can be separated from our 
cognitive abilities. Cases like this are visible in scientific literature. For example, lesions 
in particular areas of the prefrontal cortex inhibit the individual’s ability to choose from 
an array of options. This direct affect on the individual’s cognitive ability seemingly 
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 Carlson, Stephanie M., Angela C. Davis, and Jamie G. Leach. "Less Is More Executive 
Function and Symbolic Representation in Preschool Children."Psychological 
Science 16.8 (2005): 609-616. 
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substantiates the inseparable nature of executive and cognitive functions. However, this is 
not the case, as displayed by Lezak in Neuropsychological Assessment: 
When executive functions are impaired, even if only partially, the 
individual may no longer be capable of satisfactory self-care, of 
performing remunerative or useful work independently, or of maintaining 
normal social relationships regardless of how well preserved the cognitive 
capacities are.12 
 
It appears as though executive functions are responsible for some aspects of our 
character; for example, our motivation, our behavior in social situations, and our ability 
to make decisions (to name only a few). Consequently, it becomes tempting to attribute 
many identifying personality traits and our resultant decisions to our executive functions. 
This muddled relationship between cognitive and social function is what leads me to 
believe there are some parallels between executive control and prudence. This is 
especially evident in individuals who incur injuries that result in the dysfunction of 
executive control.  
 For example, there is a case of a hand surgeon who experienced a hypoxic event 
during a cardiac arrest, whose executive functions were crippled as a result. “His 
cognitive abilities, for the most part, were not greatly affected; but initiating, self-
correcting, and self-regulating behaviors were severely compromised.13” Both several 
weeks and years after the patient had recovered from the episode he underwent a battery 
of cognitive tests. Most of which came back normal as compared to his baseline. Yet he 
felt the effects in the wake of the event: 
The patient’s exceptionally good test performances belied his actual 
behavioral capacity. Seven years after the hypoxic episode, this 45-year-
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 Lezak, Muriel Deutsch. Neuropsychological Assessment. (5th ed.) Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2012. Print. 37. 
13
 Ibid. 38. 
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old man who had had a successful private practice was working for his 
brother as a delivery truck driver…his niece bought all of his clothing and 
even selected his wardrobe for important occasions… He knew neither 
where nor with what she bought his clothes, and he did not seem to 
appreciate that this ignorance was unusual…. His sister-in-law reported 
that it took several years of rigorous rule-setting to get the patient to bathe 
and change his underclothes each morning. He still changes his outer 
clothing only when instructed… If left home alone for a day or so he may 
not eat at all, although he makes coffee for himself.14 
 
This man’s volitional impairment, as evidenced by his apathy and aloofness, is unlike a 
cognitive impairment that results in the loss of memory. This total change of character, 
from an independent, type A surgeon to a lazy, aloof truck driver serves as a powerful 
example of the connection between the social implications of executive function and 
personality.  
 The example provided above serves as an excellent illustration of the importance 
of volition. Not only is it important to consider the effects it has on the motivation of an 
individual (as exemplified in the apathy of the patient above) but also on our cognitive 
abilities. This aspect of executive control is imperative when striving after a long-term 
goal. Individuals with impaired volitional capacity can engage in day-to-day affairs, but 
have no concept of future plans. Also, lack of volition makes it difficult to grasp abstract 
goals and concepts. In this way, it follows that an individual with dysfunctional volition 
would have difficulty working towards concepts like the good or God. We acquire this 
ability to abstract concepts and ideas at a young age. This point has been repeatedly 
observed in psychology studies with children, who are offered two rewards: one large and 
one small. For instance, in a study done by Mischel and Baker:  
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Children waited longer to receive a larger reward (two marshmallows vs. 
one) when it was suggested they cognitively transform the reward 
(‘imagine the marshmallows are white fluffy clouds’) than when they were 
told to imagine its taste.15 
 
Carlson, Davis and Leach replicated their observations in three and four year olds in their 
“Less Is More” task.  
It is apparent that volition possesses twofold importance in our moral lives. First, 
it motivates us. For the modern man, volition moves us to achieve our goals—to be all 
that we can be. Without volition, we cannot be independent and pursue a flourishing life. 
Second, volition allows us to strive for long-term, abstract ideals. In modernity, people 
pursue abstractions of everything from ‘equality’ to ‘freedom.’ Volition is similar to the 
will, in that, it allows us to act.  
Next, planning and decision-making are other important aspects of our executive 
control functions. In fact, they may be the most integral part. In order for an individual to 
plan, he must be able to consider changes that may occur in the future and adjust 
accordingly. “The planner must also be able to conceive of alternatives, weigh and make 
choices, and entertain both sequential and hierarchical ideas necessary for the 
development of a conceptual framework… to [carry out] the plan.16” It is clear that 
planning and decision-making integrate different cognitive functions humans possess. 
Prefrontal cortex impairment can lead to dysfunction of planning and decision-
making. Individuals in this condition often display poor judgment, risky and socially 
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 Carlson, Stephanie M., Angela C. Davis, and Jamie G. Leach. "Less Is More Executive 
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Frazier 11 
inappropriate behavior, and impulsivity.17 The most popular and widely known example 
of this is Phineas Gage. However, a study from 2008 reports that patients with damage to 
or lesions in their insular cortex failed, “to adjust their bets by the odds of winning… 
attained a lower point score on the [Cambridge Gambling] task and experienced more 
‘bankruptcies.’ There were no group differences in probability judgment. 18 ” This 
reaffirms the possibility of an individual’s cognitive functions to still be intact while 
incurring behavioral abnormalities after damage to executive control.  
The planning and decision-making capabilities of the brain’s executive function 
calls to mind the deliberative and judicial roles that prudence plays in lives of virtue. 
Thus planning and decision-making play an important role in our moral lives. This 
provides us with an explanation for an important ideal to the modern man—an ideal that 
feeds the image of the ‘self-made man.’ Modernity sees each individual as having the 
potential to attain whatever he may have within his power and influence. The power of 
planning and deliberation allows us to consider many options and direct ourselves toward 
that which we deem most ideal. 
 Last, inhibition plays a central role in the decision-making process as it is 
related to executive control. As defined by Meijers et al., “inhibition comprises 
deliberately suppressing ones dominant responses or impulses.19” By suppressing the 
instinctual, and often socially unacceptable, impulses we have, this aspect of executive 
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function prevents us from acting inappropriately—steering us clear from actions that may 
entail negative consequences. At the same time, inhibition allows us to ignore impulses 
so that we might be able to better and more appropriately respond to a situation or 
decision we face. 
Dysfunction of inhibition can lead to detrimental behaviors, as one might be able 
to imagine. The inability to suppress our most primal, irrational impulses is not ideal for a 
civil, intellectual discussion at dinner. It is apparent that someone without impulse 
control, who is dealt an insult, might respond in an inappropriate manner at a dinner 
party—perhaps with another, cruder insult or even in violence. A response like that could 
land that individual in jail. It is no surprise then, that a meta-study conducted by Meijers 
et al. found that prisoners in jail were likely to have some form of executive dysfunction. 
The study also suggested that violent offenders showed worse performance on inhibition 
tasks than did non-violent offenders.20  
The similarity to prudence is quite clear. Inhibition allows for an individual to 
suppress his most basic response so that he might use his rational to determine a better 
course of action. In this way, inhibition places an individual in a situation where he can 
use the deliberative faculties he possesses. Inhibition to the modern man is a tool that 
facilitates social participation and appropriate behavior. It provides an evolutionary 
benefit and thus, in the eyes of the modern man, has survived. Inhibition allows for 
assimilation into civilized culture. But, had things gone differently, and our society was 
uncivilized, inhibition would only get you killed.  
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III. INADEQUACIES OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
 
 It is quite clear that modern science’s account of executive control can explain, to 
some extent, the executive functions which allow us to participate appropriately in 
society. Not only can science explain executive control but it can also verify much of the 
behaviors and ideals touted by the modern man. While the parts of executive function can 
partially match up to aspects of prudence, the scientific account does not appropriately 
explicate the why. As this paper has alluded to, the scientific explanation purports that 
social adaptation provides motivation for proper use of our executive functions. 
However, prudence provides a better, more appropriate explanation for the motivation 
behind much of our decisions: the good. 
 Pursuing the good or a particular end is perhaps the most important aspect of the 
Christian understanding of prudence. For Christians this good is unity with God in 
heaven. With this as the object of human existence, and the means of human flourishing, 
it directs and perfects human decisions. In prudence’s deliberation and judgment, she 
selects the course of action that will bring the agent closer to its goal. 
 The parts of executive control do not function as the parts of prudence do. 
Although volition allows us to act and grasp abstractions, it does not always work to be 
unified with the will of God. Perfect prudence presupposes our will’s perfect union with 
God. Volition allows the modern man to pursue ideals of equality and independence but 
only as a means to an end that will not bring about the fullest of human flourishing. For 
modern science, there is no such thing as ‘perfect volition,’ just one that is self-serving. 
Modernity touts the will of the individual over everything else. That is not the message of 
Christianity, and thus not the function of prudence.  
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Next, while our brains possess the capabilities of planning and decision-making, 
the ultimate end is not always a priority. The ultimate end, for Christians, is the only end. 
Although every human seeks a flourishing life, not always do we orient ourselves to this 
end. Although our brains provide us with the ability to make ‘the right decision,’ not 
always do we make that decision for the right reason. The modern man is bound to lose 
his way as he searches for fulfillment when he uses himself as the sole measure of right 
and wrong. Prudence compiles our past experiences, those of others, and, most 
importantly, the wisdom of Revelation to guide us toward this end. 
Last, inhibition may provide social justification for appropriate behavior, but 
when social implications are stripped away, what makes the decision ‘right?’ Without 
social norms, prudence takes into account our ultimate goal and points us in that 
direction; this is the consequence of using the person of Christ as the measure by which 
we deem something right or wrong. Prudence, through the virtues, enacts the ‘right’ 
course of action because it has been honed towards our happiness, or unity with God. 
More importantly, it makes us better at selecting the ‘right’ option. Underlying the 
motivation of prudence is a desire to become more virtuous and a better individual with 
each decision we make. Consequently, by choosing the good for ourselves, we 
undoubtedly contribute to the good of others—the common good.  
 This is what separates the decision of the modern man from the Christian in our 
angry neighbor scenario. By the standard of the modern man, you are not culpable for the 
actions of the man should you return his rifle. In returning his rifle, you have done justice 
to him and your relationship. This will increase the likelihood of him lending you 
something else in the future—much to your benefit. However, there is something wrong 
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with enabling your neighbor’s murderous fury. Well-formed prudence guides you to the 
right decision for the right reason. She does this by perfecting your executive functions: 
volition, planning and decision-making, and inhibition, among others. The safety of the 
community as well as your search for flourishing is at risk. Should you listen to the 
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